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Abstract
Hospital isolation rooms are vital for the containment (when under negative pressure) of patients with, or the protection
(when under positive pressure) of patients, from airborne infectious agents. Such facilities were essential for the
management of highly contagious patients during the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks and the
more recent 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic. Many different types of door designs are used in the construction of such
isolation rooms, which may be related to the space available and affordability. Using colored food dye as a tracer, the
qualitative effects of door-opening motions on the dissemination of potentially contaminated air into and out of a single
isolation room were visualized and filmed using Reynolds-number-equivalent, small-scale, water-tank models fitted with
programmable door-opening and moving human figure motions. Careful scaling considerations involved in the design and
construction of these water-tank models enabled these results to be accurately extrapolated to the full-scale situation. Four
simple types of door design were tested: variable speed single and double, sliding and hinged doors, in combination with
the moving human figure. The resulting video footage was edited, synchronized and presented in a series of split-screen
formats. From these experiments, it is clear that double-hinged doors pose the greatest risk of leakage into or out of the
room, followed by (in order of decreasing risk) single-hinged, double-sliding and single-sliding doors. The relative effect of
the moving human figure on spreading any potential contamination was greatest with the sliding doors, as the bulk
airflows induced were large relative to those resulting from these door-opening motions. However, with the hinged doors,
the airflows induced by these door-opening motions were significantly greater. Further experiments involving a simulated
ventilated environment are required, but from these findings alone, it appears that sliding-doors are far more effective for
hospital isolation room containment.
Citation: Tang JW, Nicolle A, Pantelic J, Klettner CA, Su R, et al. (2013) Different Types of Door-Opening Motions as Contributing Factors to Containment Failures
in Hospital Isolation Rooms. PLoS ONE 8(6): e66663. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663
Editor: Cristina Costa, University Hospital San Giovanni Battista di Torino, Italy
Received February 8, 2013; Accepted May 9, 2013; Published June 24, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Tang et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: Funding for this study (and support for post-doctoral research fellow, C.A. Klettner) was provided by a grant to JWT from the Agency for Science,
Technology and Research (A*STAR grant no.: SERC 1021290099) in Singapore. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to
publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: Please note that author Julian W. Tang is a PLOS ONE Academic Editor. This does not alter the authors’ adherence to all the PLOS ONE
policies on sharing data and materials. One of the coauthors, Panu Mustakallio, is an employee of a commercial company. However, for this particular study, he
has no competing interests to declare. This does not alter the authors’ adherence to all the PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials. None of the other
coauthors have any competing interests to declare, regarding the publication of this manuscript.
* E-mail: jwtang49@hotmail.com
Introduction
Isolation rooms to contain infectious patients or to protect
vulnerable (e.g. immunocompromised) patients from infection are
an important facility to protect patients and staff against the risk of
infection by airborne pathogens [1,2]. Recommendations for their
use features in many guidelines related to the control of airborne
pathogens, especially for tuberculosis [3–6]. In the aftermath of the
severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreaks of 2003, the demand
for such rooms increased, dramatically [7–10]. Many of these were
eventually utilized in the management of patients infected with the
2009 pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus [11–14].
Although there have been many studies evaluating the
performance of such rooms with regard to the maintenance of
the pressure differential across the doors when closed [15–18],
there have been relatively fewer studies assessing how door-
opening motions and healthcare worker passage through the door
can affect the performance of such rooms [19–22]. Yet, at least
one analytical case report has demonstrated that containment
failure may result from simply opening isolation room doors [23].
This study is part of a longer-term project that aims to
demonstrate the effects of door-opening motions using a variety of
doors, with and without the passage of a human figure, on the
movement of potentially contaminated air into and out of an
isolation room, using both a small-scale, Reynolds-number-
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equivalent model in water, and a full-scale model in air. In this
study, baseline measurements were made using colored food dye
visualization in still water (i.e. to simulate still air) for each of the
moving figure-door systems, with no simulated ventilation system
imposed.
Methods
It was decided to conduct the experiments in water, at Reynolds
number equivalent lengths and velocities, such that the results
obtained in water could be directly extrapolated to the full-scale
situation in air [20]. Water was chosen because it was easier to
visualize flows, qualitatively, using coloured dye, or, more
quantitatively, using neutrally buoyant, suspended, reflective
particles for particle image velocimetry (PIV).
Water-tank Models
Two simplified, one-tenth scale (1:10) models were designed and
constructed, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 (CYS Engineering &
Trading, Singapore). All the dimensions of the one-tenth scale
models were taken from full-scale models that were being
constructed at the same time by collaborators at the Finnish
Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH) and their collaborators
Oy Halton Group (Finland). One of the larger aims of this study
involving the parallel construction of these two models was to test
and validate more fundamental scaling assumptions about flow
dynamics, using flow visualization methods as well as computa-
tional fluid dynamical (CFD) modeling.
One tank was designed to accommodate single- and double-
sliding doors, the other single- and double-hinged doors, as the
door-opening mechanisms were significantly different for these
two types (i.e. sliding versus hinged) of doors. Each of the tanks
had interchangeable door modules so that the single- and double-
version of the doors could be swapped as required for the
experiments. Otherwise the tanks were of virtually identical
dimensions. The same scale model of a human male figure was
used in each tank to maintain similarity. The figure moved on a
sliding track that was built into the floor of each tank, and which
could be programmed to move at realistic human walking speeds.
This track was regularly greased to ensure a smooth sliding action
without juddering. The movement controller chip (Arduino Mega
1280, ATmega1280 (Silicon Core), Arduino, Chiasso, Switzer-
land) for each of the tanks was manually programmed to allow the
figure and doors to move at speeds similar to those observed in real
isolation facilities.
Experimental Procedure
Once each of the figure-door movement systems in each tank
was reset, the edges around the door module (including the door
and surrounding wall partition) were carefully sealed, manually,
with VaselineH Petroleum Jelly (Unilever, London, UK) to prevent
any leakage of the food dye across the door partition prior to the
running of the experiment. Once the seal was in place, the tank
was slowly filled with water from the bottom up via a supply pipe
entering the floor of the tank. This facilitated the removal of air
bubbles from the tank, as it filled, which would otherwise obstruct
clear views of the tank from the top that were required for filming.
The tank was also placed on a custom-built table which allows a
tilt of up to 45u when the tank was full, to allow any air bubbles to
escape through small drainage air-holes that were drilled into the
roof along its edge. Any remaining bubbles were manually
suctioned using a 30 ml or 50 ml syringe and small-bore catheter
that was passed through these air-holes, as required. Once the
Figure 1. Dimensions of hinged2/sliding-door experimental scale-model water-tanks (both identical). L – tank length (0.81 m); W –
tank width (0.47 m); H – tank height (0.30 m); Dh – door height (0.205 m); Dw – door gap width (0.11 m single, 0.19 m double); Fh – figure height
(0.175 m); V1, V2 - figure velocities through Stages 1, 2 respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663.g001
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bubbles had been removed and the tank leveled again, 50 mls of
blue food dye (True Blue, Star Brand, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)
was injected into one side of the tank, as required by the
experimental protocol, i.e. into the side containing the human
figure (the ‘from dye’ protocol), or into the side without the figure
(the ‘to dye’ protocol). The syringe catheter was used to mix the
food dye carefully within the chamber to ensure a relatively
uniform dye distribution.
The tank was back-lit using a lighting rig that consisted of a
bank of 18 spotlights (240 V, 120 W, Par 38 Spot 12u, Philips,
Amsterdam, Holland) arranged in a 3-row by 6-column grid,
whose beams were diffused by a series of cloth diffusers and grease-
proof paper that was taped to the back of the water-tank model.
Three cameras were used to obtain video images: a Nikon D7000
with a 28–105 mm Nikkor AF lens in manual mode (Nikon Inc.,
Melville, NY), at 24 frames per second (fps), high definition (HD,
color, 192061280 pixels) from the front; a Nikon 3100 with a 18–
55 mm Nikkor AF-S lens in manual mode, at 24 frames per
second (fps), high definition (HD, color, 192061280 pixels) from
the top; a Photron SA1.1 camera (Dynamic Analysis System, Pte
Ltd, Singapore), at 500 fps (black and white) with a 28–85 mm
Nikkor (manual) lens, also from the front – to allow extreme slow
motion playback.
Once the lighting was in place and switched on, and the
cameras were in position and recording, the controller was
activated and the figure and doors moved according to a pre-set
program: the figure would accelerate almost instantly to its
designated scaled-down walking speed, slide towards the door. It
would then stop just before the door to allow it to open, before
passing through the doorway to enter the room. The doors would
then close behind it, completing the programmed movement cycle.
Note that the figure’s movements were not quite the same for the
sliding and hinged doors. A larger clearance in front of the figure
was required for the hinged (i.e. when opening towards the figure)
than the sliding doors so as to avoid any collision between it and
the door.
Several movement combinations were tried with the figure and
the various types of doors, including scenarios where the doors
opened and closed alone, with no figure movement, as these
defined a baseline airflow behavior for the action of these doors in
the absence of any human movement. After each experimental
run, the tank was drained of water (now coloured with food dye)
and cleaned. If necessary, a different door module was inserted
and the edges sealed with VaselineH, before the tank was refilled
and the cameras repositioned as required, for the next run.
For this baseline series of experiments, all of them were
performed in a still water environment, with no pressure
differential simulated across the doorway.
Scaling Issues and Analysis
The programmed velocities of the door-opening and human
figure movements were based on the principles of Reynolds (Re)
number equivalence, i.e. that motion in the 1:10 scale model in
water should be equivalent to the same motion at full-size in air,
i.e. Reair =UairLair/nair =Rewater =UwaterLwater/nwater where U, L
and nare the velocity, representative lengths and kinematic
viscosities in the two media, respectively. If the length scale in
the water-tank model is one-tenth of that in air (i.e. Lair = 10L-
water), and the kinematic viscosities of water at 20uC and air at
25uC (the approximate operating temperatures in this tropical
Figure 2. Photograph of camera and light-source layout. These images were taken at the stage just before the addition of the colored food
dye to one of the chambers in the experimental water-tank.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663.g002
Door-Opening Motions and Containment Failure
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 June 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 6 | e66663
climate) are 1.00461026 m2/s and 15.661026 m2/s, respectively,
then the ratio of the velocities Uair/Uwater = 1.56/1.004= 1.55.
For the angular velocities of the hinged-doors in air and water (?air
and ?water, respectively?, their equivalent linear velocities must also
scale as Uair/Uwater = Lair?air/Lwater?water = 1.55, so that the ratio
of the angular velocities are related as ?air = 0.155?water, or ?air/
?water =where L is the width of the door.
Due to the qualitative nature of the food dye tracer used for
visualization, the descriptions of its movements are best demon-
strated as a series of photographs and videos (available as Videos
S1, S2, S3, and S4), with some relative comparisons presented in
the Results below. Multiple repeats of each experimental scenario
produced very similar results at this qualitative level, which were
sufficient to show the relative differences between the performance
of the different door and human motion combinations.
Results
Velocities of door-opening and figure movement in each
scenario were defined and programmed into the controller chip
to be within a realistic parameter range when scaled up to their
full-scale motions in an air medium. Realistic walking speeds
equivalent to , 1–1.2 m/s in air were chosen for these model
parameters, though obviously walking speeds may vary consider-
ably between individuals. Only one sliding door opening-speed
was examined (Table 1, Figures 3 and 4, Videos S1–S2), as other
settings showed relatively little difference. For the hinged-doors,
both slow (Table 1, Videos S3–S4) and fast (Table 2, Figures 5 and
6) angular velocities were investigated. This was done because the
effect of these door-opening motions on the movements of the food
dye were much more dramatic and it was of interest to capture
these flows at these two speeds, with the fast parameters being
approximately twice those of the slow parameters. Brief descrip-
tions of each door-opening scenario are also included in Tables 1
and 2.
From a qualitative visual inspection of these images, it can be
clearly seen that the single-doors produce less disturbance than the
double-doors, and sliding doors produce far less air exchange than
hinged-doors, i.e. single-sliding,double-sliding,single-hinged,-
double-hinged, when the doors are graded in terms of the potential
for their door-opening motion to induce bulk air flow movement
across the doorways.
For both the single- and double-sliding doors, the movement of
the human figure through the door caused a significant additional
amount of food dye to be exchanged (both into and out of the
room) because the motion of the sliding doors themselves caused
very little disturbance to the food dye. In contrast, the relative
effect of the manikin movement on the food dye was much smaller
when moving through the single- and double-hinged doors
because the opening motion of these hinged doors caused
significantly more movement of the food dye across the doorway.
Discussion
There have been relatively few formal, published studies on the
effects of door-opening motions on the integrity of containment in
hospital isolation rooms, and even fewer where the effects of a
healthcare worker moving through the doorway has also been
considered. This study aims to fill some of these gaps in our
knowledge.
Overall, the results of this qualitative visualization study are not
surprising and relatively intuitive, however being able to visualize
these relative differences may emphasize the advantages and
disadvantages of these different door designs in a more emphatic
manner for consideration by hospital managers and administra-
tors, infection control and hospital building design teams.
For general infection control purposes, it is clear that the sliding
doors (single or double) offer some obvious advantages over the
more conventional hinged-door design in the amount of air
exchanged across isolation room doorways each time they are
opened. Yet, the majority of hospital isolation rooms still use the
more traditional hinged-door design. This may possibly be due to
the space requirements and the practicalities of higher installation
(sliding doors may be more expensive to make and install) and
maintenance costs (there are more moving parts in a sliding-
compared to a hinged-door). In addition, where air-tight, ‘non-
leaky’ containment facilities are required, it is much easier to
ensure an airtight seal around a hinged-door than a sliding-door.
An early study used tracer gas (SF6) and measured how its
concentration changed when a technician exited the isolation
room into an adjoining anteroom and then the outside corridor.
Other variables included the time intervals of sampling from the
anteroom and the outside corridor, the room size (31.3–49.3 m3)
and the ventilation rate (15–21 air changes/hour). The results
showed that the concentration of the tracer gas decreased
dramatically, as measured by a ‘dilution factor’ that was defined
by the authors, ranging from 122–211 (5 minutes after gas release)
between the isolation room and the anteroom, and 1260–3670 (10
minutes after gas release) between the isolation room and the
outside corridor [19]. However, the types of doors used for the
isolation and anterooms (i.e. hinged or sliding) were not described,
though it was probably a hinged door design. It can be seen from
the results presented here that the type of door may dramatically
affect the results as hinged door motions can rapidly accelerate any
mixing and therefore have an impact on the apparent ‘dilution
factor’ that is measured.
Tang et al. [23] described a clinical situation where a severe
case of adult chickenpox (i.e. primary varicella zoster virus, VZV,
infection) managed in a negative pressure isolation room (with no
anteroom) caused an infection of a VZV-susceptible nurse whose
only contact with the patient was when he stood outside the room
for at least 2 minutes, several times a day, handing supplies to the
VZV-immune nurse inside the room that was directly caring for
the patient. The access to the isolation room was a standard single
hinged-door that opened into the room. The non-immune nurse
developed chickenpox 10 days later. Transmission of the same
virus between the patient and the nurse was confirmed by viral
sequencing of skin lesion samples taken from both individuals. The
negative pressure difference across the doorway was measured to
be only 3 Pa and it was postulated that this was readily reversed
each time the door was opened to receive the supplies. This may
have been a fairly typical pressure differential found in many
hospital isolation units at this time, and it is clear from this incident
that this was probably insufficient to maintain the containment
during a door-opening motion event. Additional qualitative flow
visualization studies were performed using food dye in a small-
scale, water-tank model under the principle of Reynolds number
equivalence, to exam the action of the hinged-door opening
motion on the airflow across the doorway. These additional
experiments confirmed that the hinged-door opening motion into
the isolation room was likely to have caused a transient reversal of
the negative pressure, allowing airborne virus to leak out and be
inhaled and infect the non-immune nurse standing outside.
However, the water-tank model developed for this study (with a
hand-operated hinged-door) was relatively simple and crude, and
this study extends this model and tests double and sliding-door
options, also.
Door-Opening Motions and Containment Failure
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Later, Tang et al. [1], reviewed various other factors potentially
involved in the aerosol transmission of infection, and also provide
a simple estimate of the effect of a human body moving through
the doorway, suggesting that an adult of 1.7 m height, 0.3 m width
and 0.15 m depth, giving an approximate cross-sectional area of
0.51 m2, weighing about 76.5 kg (assuming a body density
equivalent to water), walking at 1 m/s through the doorway
produces an air volume flux of 255 L/s, with an attached wake of
76–230 L/s. Eames et al. [20] further refined these estimates,
using a more complex, Reynolds number-equivalent, small-scale
water-tank model, suggesting that the contribution from a human
body wake may be as much as that produced the motion of a
single hinged-door, and as much as 10% of the total room volume
for a typical isolation room volume of 31 m3, which is similar to
those described earlier by Rydock and Eian [19]. This investiga-
tion takes some aspects these earlier studies further in a qualitative
manner, i.e. by investigating the impact of the moving human
figure on different door designs, moving at different speeds, in a
1:10 motorized scale water-tank model of a single isolation room.
Johnson et al. [21] simulated the effect of a moving healthcare
worker using a life-sized manikin passing through a doorway made
of curtains, using airborne, fluorescent beads produced by a
nebulizer within the room as tracer particles. Air samplers
captured escaping fluorescent beads onto filters as the manikin
was moved through the curtains, both of which were moved by
fine wires. Fluorescence microscopy of filters obtained from
samplers placed inside and outside the room allowed a ‘particle
containment efficiency to be calculated, which indicated that the
manikin movement through the doorway did induce the escape of
particle tracers to the outside of the room. This phenomenon is
also confirmed in this study – the movement of the human figure
through the doorway does induce some backflow/backwash of
food dye out of the room as the figure enters.
A follow-up study from the same team [22] using similar a
methodology used a real hospital isolation facility with a human
volunteer to simulate the actions of a healthcare worker. They
specifically stated that hinged-doors were used between the various
room compartments (i.e. between the isolation room and
anteroom, and anteroom and outside corridor). In this more
real-life situation, they also reported that the presence of a
healthcare worker moving into and out of the isolation room
increased the escape of airborne particles, but also that increasing
degrees of negative pressure decreased the amount of particles
escaping from the isolation room. However, in this and the
previously described studies, none of the teams compared and
contrasted single- and double-hinged doors, and sliding doors were
not investigated or discussed. This study has shown the different
effects of single- and double-hinged and sliding doors on the














(degrees/s) Brief description of flow patterns
Single-sliding door
(into room)
0.79 (1.22) 0.24 (0.37) – The initial opening of the door produces relatively little leakage
across the doorway. The manikin moving through the door causes
a large efflux of food dye out of the room as he moves in, and a




0.79 (1.22) 0.24 (0.37) –
Double-sliding door
(into room)
0.79 (1.22) 0.42 (0.64) – Similar to the single-sliding door, but with larger volume effluxes.
Relatively little leakage occurs across the doorway when the doors
open. Significantly more food dye moves across the doorway when
the manikin moves into or out of the room, as described above.
Double-sliding door
(out of room)
0.79 (1.22) 0.42 (0.64) –
Single-hinged door
(into room) - slow
V1* = 0.39 (0.61)
V2* = 0.34 (0.52)
– 98.2 (15.22) The hinged-door-opening motion induces a much larger exchange
of food dye across the doorway in both directions than the sliding
door equivalent. The movement of the manikin through the door
adds to this in a delayed manner, but the volume of air moved by
the door appears significantly larger. Leading-edge vortices are
visible as the door opens and closes, and the food dye
contamination of the clean side occurs rapidly.
Single-hinged door
(out of room) - slow
0.58 (0.89) – 98.2 (15.22)
Double-hinged door
(into room) - slow
V1* = 0.35 (0.55)
V2* = 0.25 (0.39)
– 86.4 (13.4) Similar to the single-hinged door, but with larger volume effluxes.
The double-hinged-door-opening motions induce significantly
more leakage across the doorway than does the manikin moving
into or out of the room. Leading-edge vortices are visible as the
doors open and close, and the food dye contamination of the
clean side occurs extremely rapidly.
Double-hinged door
(out of room) - slow
0.53 (0.82) – 86.4 (13.4)
*Refer to Figure 1 for the meaning of these V1 and V2 parameters.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663.t001
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airflow movement generated by door-opening motions alone, as
well as in combination any manikin movement through the door
to simulate the movement of a healthcare provider.
There are several limitations with the small-scale, water-tank
model used here: no ventilation airflow has been simulated as this
is a baseline study, and the airflow motion indicated by the colored
food dye is only qualitative. Further experiments are required to
investigate the effects of various ventilation modes, though the
scaling issues for thermal buoyancy and pressure effects may make
this difficult in a small-scale, water-tank model like the one used
here. Computational fluid dynamical (CFD) modeling of the
airflows across doorways has been performed recently [24], but
this is difficult to compare directly to these experimental results as
they also take into account pressure and thermal differences across
the doorway, which are both equal on either side of the doorway
in the baseline experiments presented here. However, one
interesting finding from the CFD modeling, the phenomenon of
the back-flow of potentially contaminated air when a hinged-door
is opened, has been observed in our qualitative experimental
findings here, and demonstrated in the case report by Tang et al.
[23].
However, the conclusions from the images obtained (and in the
accompanying online videos) clearly demonstrate that sliding
doors induce much less airflow across the doorway than hinged-
doors; single-doors cause less disturbance than double-doors
(assuming that the single-doors are smaller than the double-doors,
which is not always the case in some facilities); and that the
movement of a single healthcare worker through the doorway in
either direction induces additional airflow movement, thereby
increasing the amount cross-contamination across the doorway.
The case report by Tang et al. [23] suggested that door-opening
motions will almost certainly reverse any low level pressure
differentials (i.e. ,5 Pa) across doorways, and these experiments
provide a visual representation of how and why this may occur,
with several combinations of door opening moving human figure
parameters.
Perhaps the most important implication from this study is that
whatever door design is used, there is likely to be some leakage
across the doorway to a lesser or greater degree as a human figure
moves through the door at a reasonable walking speed – which
strongly supports the requirement for anterooms.
In the small-scale water-tank models used in these experiments,
the compartment outside the isolation room, into or from which
Figure 3. Single-sliding door snapshots (side and top views; left-to-right, top-to-bottom). The series of 4 snapshots with each door-
opening, manikin movement scenario were taken with respect to the following events, rather than at specific times: food dye movement due to
door-opening motions alone then with any initial manikin movement – manikin interaction and any entrainment food dye – final food dye
movements once the manikin had come to rest at its destination position. All movement parameters are shown in Table 1 for these single-sliding
door scenarios. Note that with the sliding doors, the scenarios where the manikin enters or leaves the isolation room are effectively symmetrical
(unlike with the hinged-door scenarios). A. Manikin moving into/out of the isolation room (seen from outside/inside, respectively), V= 0.79 in water
(1.22 in air) m/s, door-opening gap velocity = 0.24 in water (0.37 in air) m/s. B. Manikin moving out of/into the isolation room (seen from outside/
inside, respectively), V= 0.79 in water (1.22 in air) m/s, door-opening gap velocity = 0.24 in water (0.37 in air) m/s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663.g003
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the manikin enters, can be considered as an anteroom or a
corridor area. The opening of the sliding- or hinged-doors induces
a variable amount of leakage (as indicated by the movement of the
food dye) from the ‘dirty’ area across the doorway to the ‘clean’
Figure 4. Double-sliding door snapshots (side and top views; left-to-right, top-to-bottom). The series of 4 snapshots with each door-
opening, manikin movement scenario were taken with respect to the following events, rather than at specific times: food dye movement due to
door-opening motions alone then with any initial manikin movement – manikin interaction and any entrainment food dye – final food dye
movements once the manikin had come to rest at its destination position. All movement parameters are shown in Table 1 for these double-sliding
door scenarios. Note that with the sliding doors, the scenarios where the manikin enters or leaves the isolation room are effectively symmetrical
(unlike with the hinged-door scenarios). A. Manikin moving into/out of the isolation room (seen from outside/inside, respectively), V= 0.79 in water
(1.22 in air) m/s, door-opening gap velocity = 0.42 in water (0.64 in air) m/s. B. Manikin moving out of/into the isolation room (seen from outside/
inside, respectively), V= 0.79 in water (1.22 in air) m/s, door-opening gap velocity = 0.42 in water (0.64 in air) m/s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663.g004






angular velocity in water
(air equivalent) (degrees/s) Brief description of flow patterns
Single-hinged door
(into room) - fast
V1* = 0.79 (1.22) V2* = 0.75 (1.17) 184.68 (28.63) Qualitatively similar to the descriptions given in Table 1,
but the food dye moves more quickly, as a result of the
faster door-opening and manikin movements.
Single-hinged door
(out of room) - fast
0.77 (1.19) 184.68 (28.63)
Double-hinged door
(into room) - fast
V1* = 0.71 (1.1) V2* = 0.88 (1.36) 163.07 (25.28) Qualitatively similar to the descriptions given in Table 1,
but the food dye moves more quickly, as a result of the
faster door-opening and manikin movements.
Double-hinged door
(out of room) - fast
0.73 (1.14) 163.07 (25.28)
*Refer to Figure 1 for the meaning of these V1 and V2 parameters.
These additional parameter settings were used with relatively similar qualitative outcomes (as shown in Figures 5 and 6).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663.t002
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area – much more so for the hinged than the sliding doors. In
addition, with the moving manikin, when entering or leaving an
isolation room there is clearly either a backwash or an entrained
drag wake flow into this outer area, arising from the passage of a
person into or out of the room, respectively. Both of these sources
of contamination argue for the use of an anteroom area adjacent
to the isolation room, in which the air should be completely
exchanged (and filtered) before allowing an exit into the corridor.
However, it is acknowledged that other more economical and
space limitation factors may also influence the availability of
anterooms with isolation units in individual hospitals or healthcare
facilities.
It is difficult to make a direct comparison with contact
transmission as to which route is more clinically significant for
acquiring hospital-related infections. One recent observational
study examined the number of viable bacteria found on hospital
door handles of different designs in certain high traffic areas in a
tertiary referral hospital in the UK. The authors found that the
door handle’s location, design and mode of use were all factors
that affected their degree of contamination, with the traditional
lever-style handles being the most highly contaminated [25].
However, in most cases when sliding doors are installed, they
are often controlled by automated detection systems that detect the
approach of people and open automatically, without any touching
of the door surface being required. Where a contact plate is
required for opening such sliding doors (particularly those leading
into dedicated isolation units), these are often ‘foot’ plates at floor
level that are operated by a person’s foot pressure, or no-touch
sensor plates at higher positions that just require the hand to be
passed over them, without any contact with them at all. In short,
the way that sliding doors are installed often preclude the need to
touch these door surfaces at all, which is another advantage of
these style of doors, particularly in areas where the isolation of
potentially infectious (or especially vulnerable) patients is of prime
clinical importance.
This study is part of an international collaboration between a
small-scale modeling facility (Singapore) and a full-scale modeling
facility (Finland). Further results from the large-scale modeling
Figure 5. Single-hinged door snapshots (sideviews only; left-to-right). The series of 4 snapshots with each door-opening, manikin
movement scenario were taken with respect to the following events, rather than at specific times: food dye movement due to door-opening motions
alone then with any initial manikin movement – manikin interaction and any entrainment food dye – final food dye movements once the manikin
had come to rest at its destination position. All movement parameters are shown in Table 2 for these single-hinged door ‘fast’ scenarios. A. Manikin
moving into the isolation room (seen from outside, V1= 0.79 in water (1.22 in air) m/s, angular velocity = 184.68 in water (28.63 in air) deg/s.). B.
Manikin moving into the isolation room (seen from inside), V2= 0.75 in water (1.17 in air) m/s, angular velocity = 184.68 in water (28.63 in air) deg/s. C.
Manikin moving out of the isolation room (seen from outside), V= 0.77 in water (1.19 in air) m/s; angular velocity = 184.68 in water (28.63 in air) deg/s.
D. Manikin moving out of the isolation room (seen from inside), V= 0.77 in water (1.19 in air) m/s; angular velocity = 184.68 in water (28.63 in air) deg/
s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663.g005
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experiments are currently in preparation for publication. In
addition, this experimental data will be used to validate the CFD
modeling of these airflow patterns across the doorway under
different ventilation modes, which is also being performed in both
the Singapore and Finnish facilities as part of this international
project.
Supporting Information
Video S1 Single sliding-door. The door was programmed to
open in various combinations involving the moving manikin
(simulating a healthcare worker) entering/leaving the isolation
room. Details of the movement parameters used for the door and
manikin motions are included within the video. All experiments
were performed in still water i.e. no simulated ventilation was
present in these baseline experiments.
(WMV)
Video S2 Double sliding-doors. The doors were pro-
grammed to open in various combinations involving the moving
manikin (simulating a healthcare worker) entering/leaving the
isolation room. Details of the movement parameters used for the
door and manikin motions are included within the video. All
experiments were performed in still water i.e. no simulated
ventilation was present in these baseline experiments.
(WMV)
Video S3 Single hinged-door. The door was programmed to
open in various combinations involving the moving manikin
(simulating a healthcare worker) entering/leaving the isolation
room. Details of the movement parameters used for the door and
manikin motions are included within the video. All experiments
were performed in still water i.e. no simulated ventilation was
present in these baseline experiments.
(WMV)
Video S4 Double hinged-doors. The doors were pro-
grammed to open in various combinations involving the moving
manikin (simulating a healthcare worker) entering/leaving the
isolation room. Details of the movement parameters used for the
door and manikin motions are included within the video. All
Figure 6. Double-hinged door snapshots (sideviews only; left-to-right). The series of 4 snapshots with each door-opening, manikin
movement scenario were taken with respect to the following events, rather than at specific times: food dye movement due to door-opening motions
alone then with any initial manikin movement – manikin interaction and any entrainment food dye – final food dye movements once the manikin
had come to rest at its destination position. All movement parameters are shown in Table 2 for these double-hinged door ‘fast’ scenarios. A.Manikin
moving into the isolation room (seen from outside, V1 = 0.71 in water (1.1 in air) m/s, angular velocity = 163.1 in water (25.3 in air) deg/s.). B. Manikin
moving into the isolation room (seen from inside), V2 = 0.88 in water (1.36 in air) m/s, angular velocity = 163.1 in water (25.3 in air) deg/s. C. Manikin
moving out of the isolation room (seen from outside), V= 0.73 in water (1.14 in air) m/s; angular velocity = 163.1 in water (25.3 in air) deg/s. D.
Manikin moving out of the isolation room (seen from inside), V= 0.73 in water (1.14 in air) m/s; angular velocity = 163.1 in water (25.3 in air) deg/s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066663.g006
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experiments were performed in still water i.e. no simulated
ventilation was present in these baseline experiments.
(WMV)
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